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I. INTRODUCTION 
Minnesota’s implied consent law was enacted to prevent the 
obvious dangers that intoxicated drivers present to the public.1 
However, the implied consent law is based on the underlying 
assumption that drivers are free to choose whether to drive 
intoxicated;2 but what happens when it turns out that this 
assumption is flawed because the driver was forced to choose 
between driving while intoxicated to escape a brutal attacker or 
staying and risking physical harm?3 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
 1.  See generally OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
MINNESOTA IMPAIRED DRIVING FACTS 2013 (2014), available at https://dps.mn    
.gov/divisions/ots/reports-statistics/Documents/minnesota-impaired-driving-facts 
-2013.pdf (“387 people died in traffic crashes and 81 (21%) were in crashes 
involving impaired (alcohol concentration of .08% or greater) drivers. . . . 2,300 
people suffered injuries in alcohol-related crashes. . . . 25,719 motorists were 
arrested for DWI . . . . One out of every seven licensed Minnesota drivers has at 
least one DWI.”). 
 2.  See infra Part II. 
 3.  See Brief of Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice and Minnesota Ass’n 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae at 4–5, Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014) (No. A12-1341), 2013 WL 8633181, at *4–5 
2
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recently held in Axelberg v. Commissioner of Public Safety that the 
Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety has the authority to 
revoke the driver’s license of an intoxicated person who is fleeing 
from domestic abuse in a motor vehicle.4 The court decided that 
not only does the Commissioner have the right to revoke the 
driver’s license, but the driver cannot even present evidence as to 
why he or she drove while intoxicated or raise the affirmative 
defense of necessity during the implied consent hearing.5 The 
court reasoned that because the implied consent law does not 
explicitly permit the driver to raise the defense,6 under the plain 
meaning of the statute, the court cannot hear the defense, no 
matter how severe the situation.7 
This Note begins by exploring the history and elements of the 
implied consent law in Minnesota.8 Then, this Note discusses the 
facts of Axelberg9 as well as the court’s analysis and decision.10 This 
Note argues that the court incorrectly concluded that the 
affirmative defense of necessity cannot be raised to challenge 
driver’s license revocation in implied consent hearings.11 Finally, 
this Note concludes by discussing how the court should have 
decided Axelberg, how the legislature can remedy the problem, and 
the public policy reasons that support amending the implied 
consent law.12 
II. HISTORY AND CONTENT OF THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW 
The first implied consent law in Minnesota was enacted in 
1961 as a way to incentivize any person exercising control over a 
motor vehicle to agree to chemical testing to determine the 
 
(“No sane individual would ask that an abused woman utterly submit to domestic 
abuse and take her beating until the abuser decided he was finished. Likewise, 
fighting back is an absurd option; escalating a fight against a dominant abuser 
vastly increases the odds of someone—abuser or abused—ending up dead.”); see 
also Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d 206. 
 4.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d 206.  
 5.  See id. at 207–08.  
 6.  See MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3 (2014).  
 7.  See Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 208–09. 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  See infra Part III.A. 
 10.  See infra Part III.B–C. 
 11.  See infra Part IV. 
 12.  See infra Part V. 
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amount of alcohol in his or her system.13 The Minnesota implied 
consent law has undergone many changes since it was enacted, but 
the basic premise remains: refusal to submit to a chemical test or 
testing above the legal limit for alcohol concentration results in 
license revocation.14 In 1971, it became “a per se violation” for an 
adult with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more “to drive, 
operate, or be in physical control” of a vehicle.15 Further, 
Minnesota’s implied consent law is imposed alongside criminal 
penalties for “driving while impaired” (DWI).16 Even though these 
systems are significantly entwined, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has determined that because the penalties associated with the 
implied consent law are not punitive, the implied consent law is 
civil in nature.17 
The primary purpose of the implied consent law is to promote 
public safety on roadways by deterring driving while intoxicated.18 
 
 13.  See 9A HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 56:2 (4th ed. 2014).   
 14.  See id. Testing became mandatory in 1984 “and the administrative penalty 
for refusing testing was increased.” Id. 
 15.  Id. (“This created the symbiotic relationship between the DWI statute 
and the Implied Consent statute.”).  
 16.  See MINN. STAT. § 169A.01 (2014).  
 17.  See State v. Hanson, 543 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn. 1996) (“Because civil 
license revocation pursuant to the implied consent statute can fairly be 
characterized as remedial, we hold that Minnesota’s statutory scheme of civil 
license revocation followed by criminal prosecution is constitutional under double 
jeopardy principles.”); see also MARGY WALLER & MARK ALLEN HUGHES, WORKING FAR 
FROM HOME: TRANSPORTATION AND WELFARE REFORM IN THE TEN BIG STATES             
1 (1999), available at http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014  
/06/1999.08.01-Waller-and-Alan-Hughes_Working-Far-From-Home_Transportation 
-and-Welfare-Reform-in-the-Ten-Big-States.pdf (“In most cases, the shortest 
distance between a poor person and a job is along a line driven in a car. Prosperity 
in America has always been strongly related to mobility and poor people work hard 
for access to opportunities.”). See generally Nick Pinto, Do DWI Laws Work?, 
CITYPAGES (June 11, 2010), http://www.citypages.com/2010-06-09/news/do-dwi    
-laws-work/ (“But what some people find even more troubling is that the two-track 
system of parallel criminal and civil penalties appears to be stacked against the 
poor and indigent. It’s hard to find a lawyer in Minnesota who’ll represent a DWI 
case for less than $500. Those who can’t afford a lawyer for their criminal case get 
assigned a public defender . . . . Since the implied consent hearing is civil, if you 
can’t afford a lawyer, you’ll be going head-to-head with the state with no one to 
represent you.”). 
 18.  State, Dep’t of Highways v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 425, 181 N.W.2d 
473, 474 (1970).  
4
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The implied consent law: (a) requires the driver take a test to 
determine if he or she is under the influence of alcohol or a 
controlled substance;19 (b) imposes penalties for refusal to take a 
chemical test;20 (c) permits the arresting officer to compel testing if 
the officer “has probable cause to believe the person has violated 
the criminal vehicular homicide and injury laws”;21 and (d) affords 
the driver “the right to consult with an attorney,” so long as 
consultation does not “unreasonably delay administration of the 
test.”22 
The implied consent law applies to all people who “drive, 
operate, or [exercise] physical control of any motor vehicle.”23 
“Physical control” includes much more conduct than simply driving 
under the influence,24 and the question of what constitutes 
“physical control” continues to be an issue for courts.25 Minnesota 
courts have found that operability of the vehicle is not necessary to 
find physical control.26 In particular, courts have interpreted 
“physical control” to include sleeping in your car,27 wandering 
around your vehicle,28 switching places with the driver,29 or sitting 
inside an immobile vehicle.30 However, it seems that there are limits 
 
 19.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a)(1). 
 20.  Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a)(2). 
 21.  Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a)(3). 
 22.  Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a)(4).  
 23.  Id. § 169A.20, subdiv. 1; see also id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1(a). 
 24.  See State v. Fleck, 777 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010) (“The term ‘physical 
control’ is more comprehensive than either the term to ‘drive’ or to ‘operate.’” 
(citing State v. Harris, 295 Minn. 38, 43, 202 N.W.2d 878, 881 (1972))).  
 25.  See id. at 237 (finding that a person sleeping in the driver’s seat is in 
physical control of the motor vehicle); see also State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 
839 (Minn. 1992) (holding that intent to drive is not an element needed to 
establish physical control). 
 26.  Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 838–39 (finding that the driver was in physical 
control of the vehicle even though the vehicle was stuck in a snow-filled ditch 
because she was in close proximity of the operating controls of the vehicle). 
 27.  Ledin v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 433, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (holding that revocation was proper when an intoxicated person was 
discovered sleeping in a car parked on the street).  
 28.  State v. Woodward, 408 N.W.2d 927, 928 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding 
that the driver was in physical control of the vehicle when she was discovered 
standing at the rear of her car).  
 29.  State v. Prior, 356 N.W.2d 754, 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that 
the driver was in physical control of the vehicle after he switched places with the 
other person in the car after they stopped in a parking lot).  
 30.  See Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 838 (stuck in snow-filled ditch); Abeln v. 
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when determining what constitutes physical control over a vehicle. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that a person 
sleeping in the front seat of the vehicle in the driveway was not in 
physical control when the car occupant had left his house to avoid 
a domestic quarrel.31 Yet, this decision was limited to criminal DWI 
cases.32 
Under the implied consent law, a test to determine alcohol 
concentration may be required when an officer has probable cause 
to believe that the person was driving under the influence.33 When 
determining whether the person has been driving under the 
influence, the officer must establish a temporal connection 
between the act of driving and the person’s intoxication.34 The 
officer often does this by asking how long ago the vehicle was 
driven or by asking the driver if he or she has consumed any 
alcohol before or while driving.35 
A. Challenging the Revocation: Administrative and Judicial Hearings 
The process of revocation begins when the commissioner 
receives a certification from a police officer stating that the driver 
either refused the chemical test or submitted to a chemical test for 
the presence of alcohol and the test results indicated an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08% or higher.36 Revocation becomes effective 
at the time the police officer or Commissioner of Public Safety 
provides notice to the driver and an order of the intent to revoke 
 
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 546, 547 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (dead 
battery); Woodward, 408 N.W.2d at 927 (flat tire). 
 31.  See State v. Pazderski, 352 N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 32.  Id. at 87; see, e.g., State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Minn. 1999) 
(holding that the driver was able to raise the defense of necessity against a 
criminal charge of DWI).  
 33.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1(b) (2014). Additionally, one of the four 
factors listed in subdivision 1(b) has to be present in addition to probable cause 
for the alcohol test to be required. Id. 
 34.  See Eggersgluss v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Minn. 
1986); Bohlig v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 379 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 35.  See Lovato v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A09-0143, 2009 WL 2928646, at 
*3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009) (holding that there was a temporal connection 
between the drinking and driving where the vehicle was parked and the driver 
admitted that she had been drinking). 
 36.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdivs. 1, 4. 
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the driver’s license is received.37 The driver is issued a seven-day 
temporary license if he or she had valid driving privileges at the 
time of revocation.38 
There is a two-prong system for challenging the revocation.39 
The driver may seek administrative and judicial review of the 
license revocation for test failure or refusal under the implied 
consent law.40 The administrative and judicial review proceedings 
are separate and not outcome-determinative.41 The administrative 
review can be requested in writing any time during the revocation 
period.42 The decision of the administrative review hearing is final 
and is not subject to judicial review.43 The administrative reviewer 
may consider evidence regarding why the license was revoked but 
also “any other material information” to determine whether 
“sufficient cause exists” for revocation.44 
The petition for judicial review must be filed in the county 
where the alleged offense occurred within thirty days after the 
notice and order of revocation.45 The petition must state “with 
specificity” the reasons why the driver is seeking rescission of the 
revocation.46 The purpose is to inform both the Commissioner and 
the court of what is at issue so that time and money are not wasted 
on undisputed matters.47 If the driver challenges the revocation,48 
 
 37.  Id. § 169A.52, subdiv. 6. But see H.R. 1305, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 
2009). This bill would have delayed license revocation and other administrative 
penalties for drivers suspected of driving under the influence until a conviction or 
guilty plea. See id. It was most likely opposed because politicians suspected it would 
weaken DWI deterrence by allowing continued driving after arrest.  
 38.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 7(c).  
 39.  Id. § 169A.53, subdivs. 12. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See Rancour v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 355 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1984) (“[T]he administrative review . . . and the judicial review . . . are 
separate and unrelated proceedings.”). 
 42.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 1. The Commissioner will review the evi-
dence and reports, render an administrative decision, and provide notice of that 
decision within fifteen days. Id. 
 43.  See Kleven v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 399 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1987) (holding that administrative review proceedings of license revocation 
under the implied consent law are not reviewable).  
 44.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 1. 
 45.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2.  
 46.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2(b)(3).  
 47.  Palbicki v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 347 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984). 
7
Sharma: Protecting Victims of Domestic Abuse from an Overly Rigid Interpr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
  
2015] AXELBERG V. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY 1629 
the district court is then required to hold an implied consent 
hearing.49 
Judicial reviews and implied consent hearings are conducted 
according to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.50 Discovery is 
mandatory but limited to the following information: notice of 
revocation, the chemical test record, the peace officer’s certificate, 
and disclosure of potential witnesses.51 Additionally, the 
constitutional protections of presumption of innocence and the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are not applied to 
the implied consent hearings because the court has held that such 
hearings are civil in nature.52 Finally, the burden of proof is on the 
Commissioner to make a prima facie case by a preponderance of 
the evidence.53 
Under Minnesota Statute section 169A.53, the scope of the 
issues for the implied consent hearing are framed as questions to 
determine whether (1) there was probable cause for the arrest;54 
(2) the person was lawfully arrested;55 (3) the person was involved 
in a traffic accident;56 (4) the person refused to take the 
preliminary screening test;57 (5) the screening test indicated an 
alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more;58 (6) the implied consent 
advisory warning was administered properly;59 (7) the person 
 
 48.  See Kristi Nielsen, Implied Consent, in MINNESOTA DWI DESKBOOK § 2.1 (3d 
ed. 2013) (“Approximately fifteen percent of drivers whose driver’s licenses are 
revoked under the implied consent law challenge their revocations.”). 
 49.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdivs. 2–3; see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 
539 (1971) (“Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued 
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of 
issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the 
licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 50.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2. 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  State, Dep’t of Highways v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 431, 181 N.W.2d 
473, 477 (1970). 
 53.  King v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 366 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985) (citing Halvorson, 288 Minn. at 424, 181 N.W.2d at 473).  
 54.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(1). 
 55.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(2). 
 56.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(3). 
 57.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(4). 
 58.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(5). 
 59.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(6). 
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refused the test;60 (8) the test indicated the presence of an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08% or more of any controlled substance in 
Schedule I or II, other than marijuana;61 (9) the test showed an 
alcohol concentration of 0.04% or more when driving a 
commercial vehicle;62 and (10) the testing method was valid and 
reliable.63 The evidence that can be considered at the judicial 
hearing is more constrained than the evidence that may be 
considered during the administrative hearing.64 
It is notable that Minnesota courts have recognized additional 
issues that can be broadly interpreted as part of the scope at 
implied consent hearings.65 Courts have permitted evidence to be 
introduced regarding whether a driver was actually driving, 
operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle.66 Courts have 
heard whether a license can be revoked when the driver became 
intoxicated after driving and getting into a vehicle collision but 
before taking a chemical test.67 And lastly, courts have heard 
whether a driver was so incapacitated that he or she was incapable 
of test refusal.68 
B. Challenges to Minnesota’s Implied Consent Law 
The history of the implied consent law in Minnesota has been 
riddled with challenges such as harsher administrative sanctions, 
criminal penalties, more relaxed constitutional safeguards, and the 
 
 60.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(7). 
 61.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(8). 
 62.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(9). 
 63.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(10). 
 64.  Id. § 169A.53, subdivs. 1–2; see also Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 
848 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Minn. 2014) (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“It is troubling that, 
under the majority’s reading, the statute gives an administrative reviewer authority 
to do justice, while the judiciary cannot.”). 
 65.  See 31 DOUGLAS HAZELTON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: MINNESOTA DWI 
HANDBOOK § 2:31 (20142015 ed.). 
 66.  See Roberts v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985) (finding that a sleeping, intoxicated person in the front seat is not in 
physical control of the vehicle when the driver had no knowledge that he was 
placed in his car and his car was inoperable). 
 67.  See Dutcher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 406 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1987) (reasoning that post-accident consumption of alcohol is an affirmative 
defense that can be used during an implied consent hearing).  
 68.  See Thornton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 384 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986) (holding that a driver was capable of making a reasoned test refusal).  
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quest for more DWI arrests.69 The following issues highlight the 
confusion created by Minnesota’s statutory system of parallel 
criminal and civil penalties for test refusal and testing above the 
legal limit. Moreover, the challenges to the implied consent law 
illustrate the changing and elusive nature of this area of law. 
1. Right to Due Process Not Violated by Lack of Hearing Prior to 
License Revocation 
Revocation a driver’s license is a procedure that is subject to 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.70 However, 
the due process requirements applicable to driver’s license 
revocations are “flexible.”71 In Dixon v. Love, the United States 
Supreme Court weighed the state’s interest in road safety against 
the need for a full evidentiary hearing prior to an administrative 
revocation of the license.72 The Court determined that procedural 
due process does not require a full evidentiary hearing prior to 
revocation of a license where the opportunity for a hearing is 
provided later.73 The Minnesota Supreme Court decided similarly 
on several occasions that a pre-hearing license revocation does not 
violate procedural due process.74 
2. Arguing that the Statute Is Coercive 
Minnesota courts have rejected the idea that the implied 
consent law is coercive because it impermissibly extracts consent by 
 
 69.  See infra Part II.B.12; see also 1 PATRICK T. BARONE & JOHN A. TARANTINO, 
DEFENDING DRINKING DRIVERS § 100 (2d ed. 30th rev. 1986) (“Grass roots lobbying 
efforts have resulted in stiffer penalties, relaxed constitutional safeguards and 
attitude reformation in the legislatures and the judiciary.”).  
 70.  See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 543 (1971).  
 71.  Goldsworthy v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 268 N.W.2d 46, 48 (Minn. 
1978). 
 72.  Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977) (“Far more substantial than the 
administrative burden, however, is the important public interest in safety on the 
roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard.”). 
 73.  Id. at 115. 
 74.  See Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 517 N.W.2d 901, 904–05 (Minn. 1994) 
(holding that the length of revocation prior to the hearing is reasonable, the 
hardship relief is generally available after the waiting period, administrative review 
is available, and that there is an interest in protecting the safety of the public), 
superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2004), as recognized in State v. 
Melde, 725 N.W.2d 99, 106 (Minn. 2006); see also State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. 
Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn. 1981).  
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threatening criminal penalties for test refusal.75 After the implied 
consent statute was amended to make test refusal a crime, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the possibility of 
criminal charges do not compel drivers to refuse the test but, 
rather, encourages them to submit to the test.76 Recently in State v. 
Brooks, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that because the 
driver was read the implied consent advisory,77 the officer made it 
clear that the driver had a choice of whether to submit to testing.78 
3. Right to Counsel at the Testing Stage of the Implied Consent 
Process 
In Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the Minnesota Constitution gives a driver 
a limited right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether 
to submit to chemical testing for blood alcohol concentration.79 
This holding highlights the confusion between the civil and 
criminal aspects of the implied consent process, because typically 
the right to consult an attorney is permitted only for criminal 
offenses.80 
C. The History of the Defense of Necessity 
“The defense of necessity is a narrow one, but it is deeply 
rooted in our legal system” and is a valid common-law defense in 
both criminal cases and civil tort actions.81 Necessity is commonly 
known as the “choice of evils” defense, where conduct that is 
otherwise banned is justified in order to prevent something worse 
from happening.82 Necessity can be used as a defense only if:       
 
 75.  See State v. Mellett, 642 N.W.2d 779, 783–85 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 76.  See McDonnell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 855–56 (Minn. 
1991) (holding that the refusal statute is not impermissibly coercive).  
 77.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2014).  
 78.  838 N.W.2d 563, 569 (Minn. 2013). 
 79.  473 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 1991). 
 80.  Id.; see also Maietta v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 663 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a driver cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel 
because implied consent hearings are civil in nature); 9A MCCARR & NORDBY, supra 
note 13, § 56:70. 
 81.  Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 214 (Minn. 2014) 
(Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 200–02, 183 
N.W.2d 541, 544–45 (1971)). 
 82.  9 MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 13, § 47:21. 
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“(1) there is no legal alternative to breaking the law, (2) the harm 
to be prevented is imminent, and (3) there is a direct, causal 
connection between breaking the law and preventing harm.”83 The 
defense can be used “only in emergency situations where the peril 
is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no alternative but the conduct 
in question.”84 The defense cannot be used when the emergency 
could have been avoided by taking precautions or if the person 
placed themselves in the position simply because it was more 
convenient.85 Minnesota recognizes necessity as a defense against 
the criminal charge of DWI when the driver is forced by specific 
circumstances to drive while intoxicated.86 
III. THE AXELBERG DECISION 
A. Material Facts of Axelberg 
On Memorial Day weekend in 2011, Jennifer Marie Axelberg 
(Ms. Axelberg) and her husband Jason Axelberg (Mr. Axelberg) 
traveled to Mr. Axelberg’s parents’ remote lake cabin in Kanabec 
County, Minnesota.87 On Monday, they walked to Fish Lake Resort 
to have drinks at the resort’s tavern.88 At some point, the Axelbergs 
began arguing.89 According to Mr. Axelberg, Ms. Axelberg did not 
provoke the argument.90 The couple walked back to the cabin later 
 
 83.  State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing United 
States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1270 (10th Cir. 1982)). In addition to the three 
elements listed, necessity also requires that “the harm that would have resulted 
from compliance with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually 
resulting from the defendant’s breach of the law.” Id. (quoting Seward, 687 F.2d at 
1275). 
 84.  State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 199, 183 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1971). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 202, 207 (Minn. 1999). 
 87.  Appellant’s Brief, Addendum & Appendix at 3, Axelberg v. Comm’r of 
Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (No. A12-1341), 2012 WL 
8453648, at *3. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. This fact is important for the defense of necessity but also 
demonstrates the ingrained belief that victims of domestic violence are to blame if 
they could have provoked the attack with words. Laurie Kratky Dore, Downward 
Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 
OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 687 n.95 (1995) (“As recognized by one court: ‘Some popular 
misconceptions about battered women include the beliefs that they are 
masochistic and actually enjoy their beatings, that they purposely provoke their 
12
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in the night without conflict, but their argument started again after 
they arrived at the cabin.91 The Axelbergs were intoxicated from 
the drinks consumed at Fish Lake Resort.92 Ms. Axelberg was 
leaning against their car, which was parked in the driveway outside 
the cabin, while the argument continued.93 Mr. Axelberg stood 
between the cabin and the car.94 The argument became physical 
when “Mr. Axelberg pushed [Ms. Axelberg] in the chest and hit 
her in the head twice.”95 
Ms. Axelberg’s options were limited because Mr. Axelberg was 
blocking her path to retreat into the cabin.96 She did not want to 
leave the property by foot because the road was unfamiliar and 
unlit; she also thought that her husband would catch up to her if 
she ran down the road.97 Ms. Axelberg did not seek help from the 
neighbors because there were few other cabins in the area and she 
was not familiar with any of the inhabitants.98 Lastly, Ms. Axelberg 
was unable to call the police because Mr. Axelberg had taken her 
cell phone, and there was no landline in the cabin.99 
After considering all these options, Ms. Axelberg decided to 
seek refuge in the car.100 She locked all the doors to stop any 
further attacks from Mr. Axelberg.101 Ms. Axelberg “testified [that] 
she intended to use the car only as a barrier to her husband and 
not to drive away from the scene.”102 However, Mr. Axelberg 
jumped on the hood of the car and punched the windshield so 
hard “that he spidered the glass.”103 Ms. Axelberg testified that she 
feared he would break the windshield and would be able to reach 
 
husbands into violent behavior, and, most critically, that women who remain in 
battering relationships are free to leave their abusers at any time.’” (quoting State 
v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (N.J. 1984))). 
 91.  Appellant’s Brief, Addendum & Appendix, supra note 87, at 3. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 4. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 4–5.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. 33-CV-11-292, 2012 WL 8527893, 
at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 3, 2012), aff’d, 831 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013), 
aff’d, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014).  
 103.  Id. 
13
Sharma: Protecting Victims of Domestic Abuse from an Overly Rigid Interpr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
  
2015] AXELBERG V. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY 1635 
her, so she started the car and backed out of the driveway.104 Mr. 
Axelberg jumped off the car but continued to shout and run after 
Ms. Axelberg.105 Ms. Axelberg remembered the route to Fish Lake 
Resort and decided to drive nine-tenths of a mile back to the 
resort.106 Mr. Axelberg started walking to the resort in pursuit of 
Ms. Axelberg.107 Ms. Axelberg arrived at the resort, parked, and 
remained in the car because she was “not sure what to do.”108 Mr. 
Axelberg arrived at the resort soon after Ms. Axelberg and 
continued to act aggressively.109 A third party observed the fight and 
called the police.110 
Kanabec County Deputy Justin Frisch arrived at the resort 
around 2:28 a.m.111 He observed the vehicle, Ms. Axelberg, Mr. 
Axelberg, and the third party in the parking lot.112 Deputy Frisch 
spoke with the Axelbergs and learned that there was an argument 
and that Ms. Axelberg had fled to the resort in the car.113 
Subsequently, Mr. Axelberg was charged with domestic assault and 
disorderly conduct,114 and Ms. Axelberg was arrested for driving 
while under the influence of alcohol.115 Ms. “Axelberg was asked to 
take a chemical test for the presence of alcohol.”116 She agreed to 
take the urine test, which showed an alcohol concentration of 
0.16.117 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. “Deputy Frisch does not recall whether [Ms. Axelberg] was in the 
vehicle at this time.” Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. Mr. Axelberg pleaded guilty to both counts of domestic assault and 
disorderly conduct. Id. at *2 n.1. 
 115.  Id. at *2. 
 116.  Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 207 (Minn. 2014). 
 117.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 2(1) (2012)) (outlining 
elements of the crime with which Ms. Axelberg was charged). 
14
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B. Procedural Posture 
The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Ms. Axelberg’s 
driver’s license118 pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 169A.52, 
subdivision 4.119 Ms. “Axelberg sought judicial review of her 
[license] revocation.”120 At the implied consent hearing, Ms. 
Axelberg argued that her license should not be revoked “because 
she acted out of necessity to protect herself from her” husband.121 
The district court sustained the revocation of her driving privileges; 
the court held that necessity is not an affirmative defense that 
drivers may raise at an implied consent hearing.122 Ms. Axelberg 
appealed the decision and the court of appeals affirmed the district 
court’s decision.123 The Minnesota Supreme Court granted her 
petition for certiorari.124 
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme Court framed 
the issue as whether the necessity defense was included in the issues 
that may be raised at the implied consent hearing pursuant to 
Minnesota Statute section 169A.53, subdivision 3.125 The Court 
determined that this was a matter of statutory interpretation that it 
would review de novo.126 The court decided that the defense of 
necessity was not explicitly included in the list of issues that may be 
 
 118.  Appellant’s Brief, Addendum & Appendix, supra note 87, at 1. Ms. 
Axelberg “received a notice of revocation of her driver’s license” on July 25, 2011, 
which was therefore effective on August 4, 2011. Id. 
 119.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 207; see MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 4 (2014). 
 120.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 207; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2. 
Ms. Axelberg filed her Implied Consent Petition on August 10, 2011. Appellant’s 
Brief, Addendum & Appendix, supra note 87, at 1.  
 121.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 207.   
 122.  Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. 33-CV-11-292, 2012 WL 8527893, 
at *3–6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 3, 2012) (citing Weierke v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 
578 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)) (“[I]t has not been explicitly 
determined that the defense is available in implied-consent cases.”), aff’d, 831 
N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 848 N.W.2d 206.  
 123.  Axelberg, 831 N.W.2d at 687. “A divided court of appeals affirmed” the 
district court’s holding that “necessity is not an affirmative defense that drivers 
may raise to challenge a civil license revocation.” Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 207. 
 124.  Appellant’s Brief & Appendix at 1, Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d 206 (No. A12-
1341), 2013 WL 8633179, at *1. Certiorari was granted on August 20, 2013. Id.  
 125.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 206.  
 126.  Id. at 208.   
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raised during implied consent hearing under Minnesota Statute 
section 169A.53127 and that the legislature intended to “limit” the 
implied consent hearings to only those issues in Minnesota Statute 
section 169A.53.128 The court then used the dictionary definition of 
“limited”129 to show the “common and approved usage” of the word 
dictates that the issues are restricted to those on the list.130 
The court concluded that the legislature’s intent was not 
ambiguous, even if the statute provided “an affirmative defense for 
the petitioner to prove that, at the time of the refusal, the 
petitioner’s refusal to permit the test was based on reasonable 
grounds.”131 Based on the canon of construction, expressio unius, 
codified in Minnesota Statute section 645.19,132 the court 
determined that because the legislature included one affirmative 
defense, they did so with the intent to exclude all other possible 
defenses.133 Further, the court concluded that the affirmative 
defense of necessity was not listed in the ten issues that drivers may 
raise at the hearing, whereas the reasonableness of the refusal was 
within the scope of the permissible issues.134 The court reasoned 
that the rules of statutory interpretation did not allow for reading 
other affirmative defenses into the statute.135 The court expressed a 
fear that if it held an affirmative defense of necessity was available 
under the statute, it would “allow for innumerable other affirmative 
defenses to be offered at implied consent hearings.”136 
 
 127.  Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b) (2014) (“The scope of the 
hearing is limited to the issues in clauses (1) to (10).”). 
 128.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 208–09. 
 129.  Id. at 208 (“The word ‘limited’ means ‘[c]onfined or restricted within 
certain limits.’” (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1019 (5th ed. 
2011))).  
 130.  Id. at 209.  
 131.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(c) (2012)).  
 132.  MINN. STAT. § 645.19 (2014) (codifying expressio unius); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 710 (9th ed. 2009) (defining expressio unius est exclusio alterius as “[a] 
canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the 
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative”). 
 133.  See Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 210.  
 134.  Id. at 209 (“[W]hether the refusal was ‘reasonable’ is within the scope of 
the issue listed in clause (7): whether the person refused to permit the test.”); see 
also MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(7).  
 135.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 210 (“‘[T]he legislature intends the entire statute 
to be effective and certain.’” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2012))).  
 136.  Id. 
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The court maintained that the common law defense of 
necessity did not apply to the implied consent law.137 The court 
argued that the legislature intended to preclude drivers from 
raising the common law defense of necessity by explicitly omitting 
it from the statute.138 Additionally, the court stated that the implied 
consent law was a “complete system of law” that supersedes the 
application of prior statutory and common law.139 
The court disagreed with Ms. Axelberg’s argument that 
because the implied consent law has been described as “quasi-
criminal,”140 common law defenses available in criminal cases 
should also apply to implied consent cases.141 The court decided 
that “the criminal proceedings for DWI serve to punish the 
driver,”142 whereas the civil proceedings “protect public safety on 
the highway.”143 Thus, in holding that the common law defenses are 
not applicable, the court effectively rebutted the presumption that 
implied consent proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.144 
Lastly, the court stated that the concerns regarding forcing 
victims of domestic abuse to choose between license revocation and 
personal safety should be directed to the legislature.145 The court 
acknowledged the competing policy considerations of preventing 
domestic abuse and protecting the public from impaired drivers.146 
The court reasoned that the question before the court was the 
statutory interpretation of the implied consent law, so the only 
policy concern that should be addressed is the risk to public safety 
from impaired drivers.147 
 
 137.  Id.   
 138.  Id. (“We have long presumed that statutes are consistent with the 
common law, and if a statute abrogates the common law, the abrogation must be 
by express wording or necessary implication.” (quoting Brekke v. THM 
Biomedical, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. 2004))). 
 139.  Id. at 211.  
 140.  See Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 
1991); Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 411, 247 N.W.2d 
385, 389 (1976), abrogated on other grounds by Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832. 
 141.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 211. 
 142.  Id. at 212 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20.285 (2014)). 
 143.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 212 (quoting Goldsworthy v. State, Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, 268 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Minn. 1978)).  
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id. (“[W]e must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they 
should be.”). 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id. at 212–13 (refusing to prioritize a policy of protecting victims of 
17
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The court released its four to three decision concluding that 
the affirmative defense of necessity cannot be raised during an 
implied consent hearing based on the reasons listed above.148 The 
decision included three strongly worded dissents from Justices 
Lillehaug, Wright, and Page.149 
IV. ANALYSIS OF AXELBERG 
A. Ms. Axelberg Acted out of Necessity 
First, Ms. Axelberg’s experiences the night of the incident 
certainly suggest that she acted out of necessity and should be 
entitled to relief. After Mr. Axelberg shoved and hit Ms. Axelberg 
in the head twice, she sought refuge in her vehicle by locking all 
the doors.150 Mr. Axelberg continued to threaten her by jumping 
on the car and pounding on the windshield until it shattered.151 
These facts show that Ms. Axelberg faced risk of imminent harm.152 
Ms. Axelberg was unable to out-run Mr. Axelberg; nor could she 
seek refuge with neighbors because she was unfamiliar with the 
area.153 Ms. Axelberg had no logical alternative other than to start 
the vehicle and drive a short distance to the nearest public 
location. The conduct of driving was the direct result of Ms. 
Axelberg’s attempt to avoid imminent harm; she was escaping a 
violent attacker.154 Her conduct was the lesser of two evils when she 
acted to avoid death or serious injury.155 Thus, she acted out of 
necessity. 
 
domestic abuse over the focus of the legislation).  
 148.  Id. at 213.   
 149.  See id. at 21317 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting); id. at 21720 (Wright, J., 
dissenting); id. at 22024 (Page, J., dissenting).  
 150.  Appellant’s Brief & Appendix, supra note 124, at 5–6.  
 151.  Id. at 6. 
 152.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “imminent” as 
“[s]omething which is threatening to happen at once,” “something to happen 
upon the instant.”).  
 153.  See Appellant’s Brief & Appendix, supra note 124, at 5. 
 154.  Id. at 6. 
 155.  See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (“[T]he defense of 
necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally covered the situation where physical 
forces beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two 
evils.”). 
18
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B. Minnesota Courts Previously Had Not Foreclosed the Possibility that a 
Necessity Defense May Be Raised When Appropriate 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has heard several implied 
consent cases that raised the defense of necessity. In Frohn v. 
Commissioner of Public Safety, the court determined that the defense 
was “unavailable” to the specific driver due to his conduct.156 The 
issue was framed as whether the defense was available to the driver, 
not whether the defense could be raised under the implied consent 
statute, permitting the inference that the defense could be 
available when the elements are met.157 If the defense was not 
available, it is unclear why the court analyzed whether the elements 
of necessity were met in the case.158 
Next, in Weierke v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court of 
appeals determined that the record did not demonstrate that the 
driver had no other options than to drive while intoxicated, and 
accordingly, the necessity defense could not be raised.159 However, 
in Weierke, the court asserted that “it has not been determined that 
the necessity defense [was] available in implied consent cases.”160 
Nevertheless, Weierke still did not foreclose the possibility that the 
defense could be asserted. 
In Solorz v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court reasoned that 
as an “error-correcting court,” it could not create a defense within 
 
 156.  No. C1-94-1250, 1995 WL 34821, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1995) 
(holding that the defense of necessity cannot be asserted with the following facts: 
appellant-driver was drinking at a bar when he had an altercation with bar 
management and a patron; he was chased to his vehicle and the pursuer pounded 
on his window; he then drove away to escape before the window broke). 
 157.  Id. at *2 (“We conclude that appellant has not met the elements 
necessary to establish the necessity defense in this case. Although appellant’s 
conduct may appear reasonable, he had alternatives other than driving his car for 
six or eight miles while intoxicated. Additionally, appellant’s own disruptive and 
belligerent conduct necessitated his removal from the bar . . . appellant must 
nevertheless take responsibility for putting himself in a dangerous position.” 
(emphasis added)).  
 158.  Id. at *1 n.1 (“Traditionally . . . proceedings have been considered 
essentially civil in nature. This view began to change in Prideaux v. State, when the 
supreme court questioned the validity of the ‘civil’ label of the license revocation 
proceedings. The criminal nature of implied consent proceedings was reinforced 
in Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety. Thus, an argument can be made that the 
necessity defense should be available in implied consent proceedings.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 159.  578 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 160.  Id.  
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the implied consent law.161 In its opinion, the court noted that “the 
task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the 
legislature.”162 
The Frohn, Weierke, and Solorz cases support the argument that 
the Axelberg court had the discretion to hold that the defense of 
necessity applied, or at the very least, that application of the 
defense was a possibility. 
C. The Court’s Absurd Interpretation of Legislative Intent 
The majority’s interpretation of Minnesota Statute section 
169A.53,163 which precludes the defense of necessity, creates an 
unreasonable result.164 Minnesota Statute section 645.17 dictates 
that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, 
impossible of execution, or unreasonable.”165 The court has an 
obligation to go beyond the plain language of the statute if a literal 
interpretation “leads to absurd results or unreasonable results.”166 
Furthermore, the consequences of a particular statutory 
interpretation are relevant for determining legislative intent.167 
Here, revoking the license of someone who was fleeing from 
imminent harm was an unreasonable result that could have been 
avoided if the court had held that the affirmative defense of 
necessity is relevant to implied consent proceedings. 
1. The Court’s Narrow Interpretation of the Scope of Judicial Review 
Yields an Unreasonable Result 
The scope of the implied consent hearing is guided by 
Minnesota Statute section 169A.53.168 The statute provides that the 
hearing is limited to the issues listed in clauses (1) to (10), which 
are phrased in the form of questions.169 As Justice Lillehaug pointed 
 
 161.  No. A12-0006, 2012 WL 3023425, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 23, 2012) 
(citing Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 162.  Id.  
 163.  See Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 208–09 (Minn. 
2014). 
 164.  See Brief of Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice and Minnesota Ass’n 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at *15.   
 165.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2012)).  
 166.  Wegener v. Comm’r of Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1993).  
 167.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (2014).  
 168.  Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b); see also supra Part II.A.  
 169.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b). 
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out in his dissent, the scope does not simply provide that the 
hearing is restricted to answering questions.170 Arguably, the 
emphasis of the scope is on the issues that are enumerated.171 It 
follows then that the issues within the scope of the hearing are: 
“probable cause; driving, operation, and physical control of the 
vehicle; the arrest; test taking or refusal; and test results.”172 Here, 
the facts surrounding Ms. Axelberg’s choice to drive while 
intoxicated are within the scope of the enumerated issues as such a 
discussion would have addressed the issues of driving, operating, 
and being in physical control of the vehicle, in addition to her 
defense for that conduct. The purpose of providing a scope of 
issues for the hearing is to create an efficient and timely process; 
however, too narrow an interpretation of the hearing’s scope 
creates an absurd result, and the scope should be permitted to 
include more than simply a yes or no answer to the listed questions. 
2. That the Defense of Necessity May Be Available for Test Refusal 
but Not for Driving While Impaired Is an Absurd Result 
The court’s holding in Axelberg created a disconnect between 
the defenses available for test refusal and those available during 
implied consent hearings. Affirmative defenses are allowed by 
statute to determine whether a driver had reasonable grounds for 
refusing to take a chemical test.173 Examples of reasonable grounds 
for test refusal include: where an officer’s request for the driver to 
take a test is confusing and misleading,174 where failure to provide 
samples resulted from a physical inability,175 and where the driver 
 
 170.  Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 214 (Minn. 2014) 
(Lillehaug, J., dissenting).  
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id.  
 173.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(c) (“It is an affirmative defense for the 
petitioner to prove that, at the time of the refusal, the petitioner’s refusal to 
permit the test was based upon reasonable grounds.”). 
 174.  See State, Dep’t of Highways v. Beckley, 291 Minn. 483, 485–87, 192 
N.W.2d 441, 444–45 (1971) (finding that the driver had reasonable grounds to 
refuse the test because the officer failed to clarify the rights and obligations under 
the implied consent statute). But see Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 
N.W.2d 99, 102–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that test refusal was not 
reasonable where a driver was too intoxicated to understand his rights and 
obligations). 
 175.  See Aunan v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 361 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding that the trial court must determine if the “failure to provide 
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intends to plead guilty to the criminal charge of DWI.176 Under this 
“reasonable grounds” standard, it is possible that necessity could be 
a viable affirmative defense for test refusal. 
This, too, creates an unreasonable result because it entices 
drivers who can claim a defense of necessity to refuse the test. “The 
obvious and intended effect of the implied-consent law is to   
coerce the driver suspected of driving under the influence                      
into ‘consenting’ to chemical testing . . . .”177 Allowing affirmative 
defenses only for test refusal would frustrate the purpose of the 
implied consent law, which is to encourage consent to the test.178 
Hence, it creates an absurd result to allow affirmative defenses only 
for test refusal and not for testing above the alcohol concentration 
limit. 
D. Courts Have Considered Issues Beyond the Ten Enumerated Questions 
in the Past 
The following cases illustrate how, historically, Minnesota 
courts have broadly interpreted the scope of implied consent 
hearings, permitting the consideration of issues other than those 
enumerated in Minnesota statute 169A.53. These cases support the 
argument that the supreme court should have considered the 
affirmative defense of necessity in Axelberg. 
1. Dutcher v. Commissioner of Public Safety 
The affirmative defense of post-accident alcohol consumption 
is not one of the issues expressly permitted to be heard during the 
implied consent hearing; however, the defense was recognized in 
Dutcher v. Commissioner of Public Safety.179 The court of appeals 
reasoned that it was simply good policy because it did not want to 
punish someone who was not drinking at the time the car accident 
occurred.180 Similarly, in Axelberg, it is not good public policy to 
 
two breath samples resulted from . . . physical inability”).  
 176.  See State, Dep’t of Highways v. Schlief, 289 Minn. 461, 463, 185 N.W.2d 
274, 276 (1971). 
 177.  Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 409, 247 N.W.2d 
385, 388 (1976), abrogated on other grounds by Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 
473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 1991).  
 178.  See id. 
 179.  406 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).  
 180.  Id.  
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deny the affirmative defense of necessity simply because it is not 
enumerated in the statute. 
2. Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety 
The “civil” label of license revocation under the implied 
consent law is not enough to extinguish certain constitutional 
safeguards, such as consulting with an attorney prior to taking a 
chemical test for alcohol concentration.181 Therefore, constitutional 
issues are recognized as defenses even though they are not listed in 
the ten enumerated issues in Minnesota Statute section 169A.53. In 
Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the supreme court relied on 
article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution to determine that 
a driver has a constitutional right to consult with counsel because 
the testing decision is a “critical stage” in a DWI proceeding.182 
E. The Court Does Not Always Strictly Adhere to the Limits Imposed by 
Statutory Text 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently decided in State v. Ali 
that mandatory life without the possibility of release (LWOR) 
sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional when the sentences are 
imposed without a judge or jury having the opportunity to consider 
mitigating circumstances.183 The court reversed the imposition of a 
mandatory sentence of LWOR even though the sentence is 
expressly permitted by the legislature in the statutory text.184 The 
majority determined that its decision will “effectuat[e] the 
legislative policy” even if that policy is not yet written in the 
statute.185 
The court tried to distinguish Axelberg from Ali on the basis 
that in Ali “the Legislature has not yet expressed its policy 
preference,” whereas in Axelberg, the public policy is clear, and “it is 
the prerogative of the Legislature, not the judiciary, to determine 
 
 181.  Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 834. 
 182.  Id. at 837.  
 183.  855 N.W.2d 235, 256–57 (Minn. 2014).  
 184.  Id. at 253 (discussing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)) (finding 
that mandatory LWOR sentences are unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 
even though Minnesota statutes currently allow for mandatory LWOR sentences 
and the legislature has not changed the statutes). 
 185.  Id. at 256 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 
20, 27 (Minn. 2006)). 
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what constitutes sound public policy and to make the statutory 
revisions necessary to reflect that policy determination.”186 
However, in Ali, the legislature arguably clearly expressed its policy 
preference for mandatory LWOR sentences in the statutory 
language.187 Additionally, the legislature had been alerted to the 
LWOR problem by Miller v. Alabama and had not yet changed the 
statute in response. Conversely, in Axelberg, the legislature did not 
explicitly prohibit using the defense of necessity to escape domestic 
violence; the policy preference is far from clear.188 The defense of 
necessity is a common-law defense that has not been addressed by 
the Minnesota legislature but continues to be used as an affirmative 
defense in the courts. The court’s argument in Axelberg that it 
would be “pure judicial will”189 if the court effectuated the necessity 
defense was, in reality, the court’s exercise of judicial restraint with 
respect to an unpopular issue. 
The court improperly differentiated between Ali and Axelberg. 
At issue in Axelberg were two policy concerns: safety on the roads 
and advocating for victims of domestic violence.190 The legislature 
has expressed its interest in protecting victims of domestic violence; 
however, the court failed to give sufficient weight to that policy 
concern, employing its rhetoric of strict statutory adherence.191 
Notwithstanding the conflicting policies, Axelberg was more a 
question of the application of a defense “deeply rooted in our 
jurisprudence.”192 It is unlikely that the legislature intended to 
prevent people facing assault, murder, or rape from hiding in their 
cars, or, in the most desperate situations, driving away from their 
 
 186.  Id. at 266 (Page, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 187.  Id. at 256 (majority opinion). 
 188.  Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 217 (Minn. 2014) 
(Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, the necessity defense is not a mere policy 
preference; it is a legal concept deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.”). “If there is 
any ‘pure judicial will’ being exercised in [Axelberg], it might be the majority’s 
interpretation of this statute without regard to its ‘application to an existing 
situation.’” Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012)).  
 189.  Id. at 212 (majority opinion).  
 190.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 212 (“This case therefore could be cast in terms 
of competing policy considerations, with policies aimed at protecting victims of 
domestic abuse competing with policies aimed at protecting victims of impaired 
drivers.”) 
 191.  Id. (“This public policy concern [personal safety of victims of domestic 
abuse] should be directed to the Legislature because we must read this state’s laws 
as they are, not as some argue they should be.”). 
 192.  Id. at 217 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
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attacker. The court in Axelberg could have read the statute more 
broadly to include a defense of necessity, but it chose not to. The 
court in Ali determined that “remanding . . . will not infringe on 
the Legislature’s unique power to define the punishment for 
crimes.”193 Similarly, if the court in Axelberg found that the defense 
of necessity was available, it would not have infringed upon the 
legislature’s power to define crimes or encourage test consent. Nor 
would it “impair the commissioner’s ability to process implied 
consent cases because the necessity defense is so rare and so 
difficult to prevail on.”194 
F. Refuting the Majority’s Espressio Unius Interpretation 
It is unreasonable to interpret the absence of an explicit 
reference to “necessity” as a bar to the defense being used in 
implied consent hearings. The majority in Axelberg asserts that since 
the statute mentions an affirmative defense of proving that the test 
refusal was based on reasonable grounds, all other affirmative 
defenses are prohibited.195 Justice Lillehaug raised the argument 
that the legislature chose to use the definite article “an” instead of 
the limiting definite article “the.”196 He argued that if the 
legislature intended to limit the affirmative defenses to only this 
one, it could have easily done so by the use of: “the only affirmative 
defense,” “the one affirmative defense,” or simply “the affirmative 
defense.”197 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the legislature intended that the 
affirmative defense be available for proof of reasonable test refusal 
but not for test failure.198 It is also unlikely that the legislature 
intended for the affirmative defense to be available during 
administrative but not judicial review.199 This interpretation creates 
inconsistencies within the statutory framework. As Justice Wright 
pointed out, the legislature’s purpose in enacting this statute was to 
 
 193.  State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 256 (Minn. 2014).  
 194.  Appellant’s Brief & Appendix, supra note 124, at 16.  
 195.  See Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 209.  
 196.  Id. at 215.  
 197.  Id.  
 198.  See id. at 218 (Wright, J., dissenting).  
 199.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 1 (2014) (explaining                 
the applicability of the affirmative defense for administrative review), with id.                
§ 169A.53, subdiv. 2 (explaining the applicability of the affirmative defense for 
judicial review).  
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criminalize test refusal.200 But the majority’s decision promotes 
refusal of the chemical test for drivers in similar circumstances to 
Axelberg in order to invoke the necessity defense.201 
G. Quasi-Criminal Nature of the Implied Consent Law 
Courts have distinguished prosecutions for DWI and implied 
consent proceedings on the basis that one is criminal and one is 
civil.202 Procedurally, implied consent hearings may be civil, but the 
hearings are held at the same time and stem from the same facts 
and conduct as the criminal hearings for DWI.203 Minnesota courts 
have recognized the affirmative defense of necessity in the criminal 
charge of DWI.204 Additionally, “the emergency operation of any 
vehicle when avoiding imminent danger” creates an exception for 
the crime of reckless driving.205 So, why would this exception not 
extend to implied consent proceedings? 
The court has recognized that driver’s license revocations are 
“necessarily and inextricably intertwined with an undeniably 
criminal proceeding.”206 In Friedman, the court said that the implied 
consent hearings are “quasi-criminal” and, on that basis, provided a 
limited right to counsel that has typically been reserved for 
criminal defendants.207 However, although the court has recognized 
the quasi-criminal nature of the implied consent proceeding, it 
 
 200.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 218.  
 201.  Id.  
 202.  Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 410, 247 N.W.2d 
385, 389 (1976) (“Only after the driver makes his decision regarding the test does 
the proceeding divide clearly into its civil and criminal aspects . . . .”), abrogated on 
other grounds by Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 
1991). 
 203.  Id. at 410, 247 N.W.2d at 38889 (“The license revocation proceeding 
thus becomes an arm of the prosecutor in his attempt to gather evidence against 
the accused for use in criminal prosecution. Moreover, it is used as a means of 
obtaining evidence [a]t the time of arrest or detention for suspicion [o]f driving 
under the influence.” (alterations in original)). Although Prideaux was overruled, 
the language regarding the hybrid nature of implied consent hearings remains 
valid.  
 204.  State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 201, 207 (Minn. 1999) (holding that a 
necessity instruction is appropriate in a criminal case where the defendant 
asserted that she hid in a car from her abusive boyfriend).  
 205.  MINN. STAT. § 169.13, subdiv. 3(b)(2) (2014).  
 206.  Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 409, 247 N.W.2d at 388. 
 207.  See Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832, 835.  
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refused to also recognize the traditional protections provided in 
criminal matters,208 such as allowing common-law defenses. Even if 
the application of the necessity defense has only been applied in 
criminal and civil tort cases, the legislature allowed room for the 
court to recognize the defense of necessity in implied consent 
hearings when appropriate.209 
Although implied consent hearings are “civil” in nature,210 the 
penalties imposed are arguably just as harsh as the criminal DWI 
sanctions.211 The revocation of a driver’s license may have the effect 
of taking away a person’s ability to earn a living, which can be just 
as devastating as fines or imprisonment.212 The result of losing a 
 
 208.  See Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 184, 186–87 (Minn. 
1994) (holding that evidence of alcohol-impaired driving obtained from an 
unconstitutional sobriety-check roadblock could not be used at an implied 
consent proceeding).  
 209.  See Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Minn. 
2014) (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).  
 210.  See id. at 214 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(a) (2012)). 
 211.  See Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 410, 247 N.W.2d at 389 (arguing that the loss 
of a driver’s license can be devastating); see also MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
DRIVER’S LICENSE DWI ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS INITIATIVE: SUMMARY REPORT        
3 (2011), available at https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ots/educational-materials 
/Documents/DWI-Adminstative-Sanctions-Report.pdf. 
The removal of a license after a DWI could hamper one’s ability to get 
to work, treatment, [Alcoholics Anonymous] groups, therapy and  
court appearances—the very things associated with compliance, 
responsibility and sobriety . . . . Based on the number of “Driving after 
Withdrawal” violations issued, many people continue to drive illegally 
after their license had been revoked or cancelled. Often these 
individuals are also driving without insurance. Illegal driving is not just 
a Minnesota problem. Nationally it is estimated that at least 70 percent 
of people continue driving even after their license has been revoked or 
cancelled. 
Id. 
 212.  See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 30 (1979) (“Even a day’s loss of a 
driver’s license can inflict grave injury upon a person who depends upon an 
automobile for continued employment in his job.”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 
539 (1971) (“Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued 
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of 
issued licenses thus involved state action that adjudicates important interests of the 
licensees.”); see also Lee A. Bjorndal, Mower County License Return Program: Breaking 
the Cycle of Revocations, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2001, at 26 (“A driver’s license is an 
absolute necessity for most Minnesotans. We need our driver’s license to get to 
work, to transport children, and to travel. In many communities, there is no public 
transportation. Businesses are often near the outskirts of town and not within 
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driver’s license may lead to additional offenses:213 driving after 
suspension,214 driving after revocation,215 and driving after 
cancellation.216 Furthermore, the Commissioner of Public Safety 
can use prior convictions as reasons to lengthen license 
revocation.217 Finally, criminal DWI penalties can be enhanced by 
prior license revocations.218 Criminal proceedings and implied 
consent proceedings are undeniably intertwined, and those who 
want to establish an affirmative defense for either proceeding 
should be afforded the opportunity. 
V. WHAT CAN BE DONE GOING FORWARD TO REMEDY                      
THIS PROBLEM? 
A. How the Court Should Have Decided Axelberg 
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have held that the 
necessity defense may be raised in implied consent hearings. First, 
the court should have concluded that the interpretation of the 
issues enumerated in the implied consent statute extend more 
broadly to include affirmative defenses related to the proceeding.219 
This would be consistent with the legislature’s express intent to 
 
walking distance.”); Means of Transportation to Work by Selected Characteristics 2011     
–2013 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://fact 
finder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_13
_3YR_S0802&prodType=table (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (showing that 
approximately eighty-two percent of employees in Minnesota drive alone or 
carpool to work).  
 213.  Bjorndal, supra note 212 (“[P]eople are able to drive legally and not get 
involved in a downward spiral of one driver’s license offense after another.”); U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, COMMUTING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 18 (2011), available     
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs-15.pdf (demonstrating that 
“[c]ommuting in the United States is dominated by private automobile travel, as is 
evidenced by the large proportion (86.1 percent) of workers 16 years and over 
who commuted by car, truck, or van in 2009”).   
 214.  MINN. STAT. § 171.24, subdiv. 1 (2014). 
 215.  Id. § 171.24, subdiv. 2. 
 216.  Id. § 171.24, subdiv. 3. 
 217.  See id. § 169A.54, subdiv. 1.  
 218.  Id. §§ 169A.03, subdiv. 21(a)(1), 169A.24, subdiv. 1(1); see also State v. 
Omwega, 769 N.W.2d 291, 293–94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that using 
prior implied consent license revocations to enhance a misdemeanor DWI charge 
is constitutional where a driver was provided notice of the revocation and the 
process for challenging it).  
 219.  See supra Part IV.CD. 
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prevent unreasonable results.220 The court has shown that it has the 
power to go beyond strict statutory interpretation when the 
circumstances warrant doing so.221 Next, the court should have 
examined the quasi-criminal nature of implied consent 
proceedings to determine that the consequences of license 
revocation are as severe as fines and imprisonment, especially when 
taking independence away from a person facing domestic 
violence.222 Lastly, the court should not have turned a blind eye to 
its fundamental function of administering justice,223 particularly 
given the extreme facts presented by the Axelberg case. 
B. How the Legislature Can Address the Problem 
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court has foreclosed the 
possibility of the use of the defense of necessity for test failure in 
judicial implied consent hearings, a possible solution is to 
encourage the legislature to amend the language of Minnesota 
Statute section 169A.53. There is pending legislation that clarifies 
the scope of the implied consent hearing and would allow for the 
affirmative defense of necessity to be used in judicial implied 
consent hearings.224 The proposed change to Minnesota Statute 
section 169A.53 would delete language that only allows affirmative 
defenses for reasonable test refusal during judicial hearings and 
adds language permitting all the affirmative defenses allowed in 
criminal DWI proceedings.225 These defenses include: when the 
driver consumed alcohol after the violation but before the alcohol 
concentration test; using prescription drugs according to the 
prescription while operating a vehicle; reasonable test refusal; and 
“[i]f proven by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . [when] the 
defendant’s conduct was a result of necessity.”226 It also creates a 
requirement that notice must be given to the Commissioner seven 
days prior to the hearing if an affirmative defense will be raised.227 
The proposed legislation aligns the criminal prosecutions and 
 
 220.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 221.  See supra Part IV.D. 
 222.  See supra Part IV.G. 
 223.  See, e.g., In re Petition for Integration of the Bar of Minn., 216 Minn. 195, 
199, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943). 
 224.  S.F. 1073, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2015).  
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id.  
 227.  Id.  
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implied consent hearings, addressing concerns that implied 
consent hearings are “quasi-criminal” in nature and should be 
treated as such. 
C. Allowing the Affirmative Defense of Necessity in Implied Consent Cases 
Is Good Public Policy 
At its core, the affirmative defense of necessity is based on 
good public policy. “In essence it reflects a determination that if, in 
defining the offense, the legislature had foreseen the 
circumstances faced by the defendant, it would have created an 
exception.”228 As Axelberg makes clear, the legislature did not weigh 
the competing values of driving while intoxicated to escape a 
violent attacker with keeping the roads clear of impaired drivers. If 
it had, Minnesota Statute section 169A.53 would likely have 
included such circumstances in its enumerated issues. 
The court adopted a view that denies complete protection to 
victims who seek refuge in their vehicles and to those escaping a 
violent encounter.229 A domestic abuse victim’s loss of a driver’s 
license “may deprive [him or her] of financial independence, 
treatment and counseling services, transportation for [his or her] 
children, and the only reliable means of escape in the next 
emergency.”230 
Implied consent law should not be interpreted in a manner 
that is contrary to the legislature’s efforts to protect victims of 
domestic abuse231 in response to the prevalence of domestic 
violence in our society.232 Minnesota district courts handled 27,288 
 
 228.  State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 946 (N.J. 1986).  
 229.  See Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014). 
 230.  Id. at 216 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
 231.  See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdivs. 123 (2014). The Domestic Abuse Act 
became effective on May 25, 1979. Act of May 25, 1979, ch. 214, 1979 Minn. Laws 
214, 414–17; see MINN. STAT. ch. 5B (allowing victims of violence to establish 
designated addresses in all public matters to prevent harm from being located 
through the “Safe at Home” program). 
 232.  See MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, 2013 ANNUAL FEMICIDE REPORT 7 
(2013) (“At least 38 Minnesotans were killed due to violence from a current or 
former intimate partner.”); see also Minnesota Injury Data Access System (MIDAS)—
Hospital Data, MINN. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/midas 
/ub92/index.cfm (last visited May 4, 2015) (select “Minnesota Regions” and “State 
of Minnesota” as the Region/County; then “Battering/maltreatment” and “Rape” 
as the Mechanism/Cause; and then “Compare Genders” as the Gender). In 2013, 
1328 patients received treatment for injuries in hospitals in Minnesota related to 
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domestic violence cases in 2011.233 A 2010 National Intimate 
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 684,000 Minnesota 
women will be subjected to “[p]revalence of [r]ape, [p]hysical 
[v]iolence, and/or [s]talking by an [i]ntimate [p]artner” during 
their lifetime.234 The Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women 
reports that at least twenty-five women died from domestic violence 
in Minnesota during 2013.235 This is consistent with national 
pervasiveness of domestic violence; the CDC reported that 
“[a]pproximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are 
physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the       
United States.”236 “The study makes it clear that violence against        
women . . . should be classified as a major public health and 
criminal justice concern in the United States.”237 The implied 
consent law should not be interpreted in a manner that re-
victimizes people affected by domestic violence. 
One concern is that permitting necessity as an affirmative 
defense might allow for false claims of abuse when a driver is 
accused of driving while intoxicated, which would impair the 
Commissioner of Public Safety’s ability to quickly process cases.238 
However, necessity is rarely used and it is difficult to prove.239 
[O]nce in a great while a . . . case comes along that 
presents facts so bizarre and remote from the public 
 
battery and rape (958 battering/maltreatment and 370 rapes). Id. Eighty-two 
percent of the battery/maltreatment patients were women. Id. 
 233.  MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY: THE 2011 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH 1719 (2011), available at http://www 
.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Court_Information_Office/AR_11_Final2.pdf 
(including 2853 felony domestic assault cases; 2863 gross misdemeanor domestic 
assault cases; 10,607 misdemeanor domestic assault cases; and 10,965 domestic 
abuse filings).  
 234.  The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS), CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention 
/nisvs/state _tables_74.html (last updated Nov. 14, 2014). 
 235.  MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 232, at 7.  
 236.  PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT 
OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: 
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, at iv (2000), 
available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.  
 237.  Id. at v.  
 238.  Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2013) (Chutich, J., dissent), aff’d, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014). 
 239.  Id.  
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policy underlying the law that even a Court as committed 
as this one to the strict enforcement of the drunk-driving 
statutes can pause to make certain that no injustice has 
been done.240 
Axelberg is such a case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, impaired driving is a valid concern for our 
society, but the interpretation of laws should not neglect the 
importance of preventing unreasonable results by disallowing valid 
affirmative defenses. The court held that the statute at issue in 
Axelberg addresses only a policy aimed at protecting the public from 
impaired drivers and therefore did not require an analysis into the 
policy interest of protecting victims of domestic violence.241 The 
inclusion of the affirmative defense of necessity is at the heart of a 
policy that protects all citizens of Minnesota. The implied consent 
law implies that the driver has a choice as to whether or not to get 
into a vehicle or drive while intoxicated. In this case, there was no 
reasonable choice or alternative in order to escape a violent attack. 
To not apply the defense of necessity in these circumstances was to 
allow an injustice. 
 
 
 240.  State v. Fogarty, 607 A.2d 624, 632 (N.J. 1992) (Stein, J., dissenting).  
 241.  Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 212–213. 
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